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THE ROLE OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS ON 
FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY: A REVIEW OF 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH  
 
ABSTRACT 
As a result of recent national and international financial scandals, the financial 
information published by companies has often lost its credibility and transparency. In 
an attempt to regain confidence in the information produced and released by 
companies, a series of codes of good corporate governance have been published, with 
one of their main recommendations being that the Board of Directors be composed of 
external directors, particularly independent directors, given the role they can play in 
ensuring the production of quality financial information. Independent directors are those 
who, appointed for their professional and personal qualities, can perform their duties 
without being influenced by direct relationships with the company, its significant 
shareholders or managers. Therefore, this paper aims to review the literature which 
refers to the impact that independent directors on the Board of Directors have on the 
quality of financial reporting. The results revealed by the studies have mostly shown a 
positive relationship between the tasks performed by such directors and the quality and 
integrity of accounting information. However, it should be emphasized that the results 
documented in the studies carried out in a Spanish and Anglo-Saxon context differ 
somewhat, which could be explained by the legal, cultural, social and corporate 
governance culture differences, amongst others, which exist between the two 
countries. 
 
Key words: Independent directors, Board of directors, Financial reporting quality, The 
Codes of Good Corporate Governance. 
JEL Classification: G3, P43. 
 
 
1. Deeply appreciate all the help provided by my tutor, María Consuelo Pucheta Martínez. 
  
 4 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Board of Directors (hereafter, the Board) is the decision-making body within the  
company which takes on, by delegation of shareholders, an essential role defined as 
that of "general supervision," which includes complete control and management of the 
organisation. The most important functions carried out by the Board are centred around 
three main responsibilities: to guide and promote company policy (strategic 
management), to control and manage the large corporations (control management) and 
to act as liaison between shareholders and senior management (communication 
management). The Board emerges as a control measure, since firms are continually 
increasing in size and becoming more complex in terms of management, which causes 
a breach between management and ownership. 
 
In Spain, listed companies have improved the structure of corporate governance over 
time. The Codes of Good Corporate Governance, which have been published since 
1998 until now, have played an important role. The first report on Corporate 
Governance, known as the Olivencia Report, was published in 1998, which promoted 
the presence of external directors on corporate governance bodies, on the Board in 
particular. It specifically proposed greater presence of independent directors, which led 
the National Securities Market Commission in Spain (CNMV) to draft a set of "Standard 
Regulations which relate to the Code of Good Governance for Boards" in May 1998. 
Since then, the CNMV has decisively influenced the general structure and content of 
corporate governance, encouraging a majority presence of external directors and, 
among them, independent directors. Hence, these recommendations consolidated the 
strict reorganisation of the Board to which the Financial System Reform Law (2002) 
has also required all listed companies with an audit committee. In addition, the 
Olivencia Report (1998) also recommended the establishment of nominations 
committees to the Board, with a larger proportion of independent directors. 
 
In 2003 the Aldama Report, which replaces the Olivencia Report (1998),was published 
and outlines that the role of external directors, in particular the independent ones,  
would be reduced to the control of other Council members and to the representation of 
minority shareholders, in contrary to that outlined in the Olivencia Report (1998). And 
finally, in 2006 the Unified Code of Good Governance (CUBG), known as the Conthe 
Code, was published; a combination of the above two codes, i.e. the Olivencia Report 
(1998) and the Aldama Report (2003). The CUBG (2006), in terms of uniformity, 
 5 
 
provides for the concept of independent directors, concluding that "at least one third of 
the total number of board members" should be independent. 
 
However, the recommendations made by the Codes of Good Corporate Governance 
are not always followed; as it happened, over time the independent directors 
represented a minority shareholder in comparison with the directors or those belonging 
to different categories. With this we wish to outline that the recommendations in the 
Olivencia Report (1998), which stated that “the presence of independent and 
proprietary board members should be proportional to the relationship between the 
percentage of capital held by shareholders represented on the Board and the floating 
capital or that held by investors,”  were frequently disregarded. 
 
The Board is composed of different types of directors differentiating between executive 
directors or internal ones and non-executive directors or external ones, where the latter 
are then separated into two categories, proprietary and independent. To later 
understand the core of this research, which focuses on independent directors, firstly we 
shall define briefly and concisely each one of the directors which comprise the Board. 
According to the CUBG (2006), directors who hold shares above or equal to the legally 
determined threshold for significant shareholdings, or who have been appointed due to 
their status as shareholders or representatives of such, are classified as proprietary 
(CNMV, 2006). Internal or executive directors are those directors who serve as 
members of senior management or are employees of the company or its group, while 
independent directors are those who, appointed for their professional and personal 
qualities, can carry out their duties without being influenced by company relations, its 
significant shareholders or management. 
 
Therefore, the main distinction between external directors, which may be proprietary 
and independent, lies in their complete autonomy when performing their duties relative 
to the directors, significant shareholders (when they hold more than 5% of company 
capital) and the company as a whole. 
 
The presence of independent directors on the Board has become a feature of Spanish 
listed companies, aligning the interests between management and shareholders, and 
therefore, reducing agency costs (Weisbach, 1988; Boeker, 1992; Hambrick and 
Jackson, 2000). This trend continues in American companies, where the latest review 
conducted by Business Roundtable (2007) highlights that 90% of companies state that 
at least 80% of their directors are independent. Business Roundtable (BRT) is an 
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association of chief executive officers (CEOs) of leading US corporations. However, in 
recent years, studies such as Shen (2005), Finkelstein et al. (2008) and Hillman et al. 
(2010) have drawn attention to the desirability of incorporating board directors who hold 
significant stakes in the capital of the company, understanding them to be the 
proprietary director, a very distinctive figure in the Spanish business model. 
 
After highlighting important aspects of Spanish companies in reference to their 
corporate governance, in particular to the Board, and defining the different categories 
of directors which comprise the same, we ask ourselves whether a greater presence of 
independent directors on the Board might help to increase the quality of financial 
information published by companies. 
 
In line with this, works such as Baysinger and Butler (1985), Daily and Dalton (1993), 
Barnhart (1994) and Macvey (2005), among others, revealed that the presence of 
independent directors on both the Board and the Audit Committee positively influences 
the quality of financial information. Thus, the main conclusion reached by these studies 
was that increased quality of financial information, resulting from increased 
participation of independent directors on the Board, protected the interests of 
shareholders and avoided opportunistic management conduct. 
 
In contrast, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Bhagat and Bolton (2008) show that a 
larger number of independent directors on the Board adversely affects the quality of 
financial reporting. These results could be justified not only with the existence of 
agency problems, as a result of the divergence of interests between owners and 
managers, but also with the lack of managers' knowledge of key company aspects. 
 
Works such as Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Dalton (1998), among others, 
revealed no significant relationship between the presence of independent directors on 
the Board and the quality of financial reporting. They state that the composition of the 
Board will be based on the ethics of corporate governance, i.e. paying little attention to 
whether there are more or less independent directors on the Board. 
 
All those characteristics that lead to increasing the quality of financial information, 
regardless of the existence of a greater number of one or another type of director on 
the Board, could reflect the role of efficient company supervision as shown by Salas 
(2000) and Klapper and Love (2003), among others. It seems reasonable to suggest 
that thorough and efficient supervision by the Board can have a positive impact on the 
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quality of financial information, given that a well organised structure within the Board 
seeks, among other things; the publication of relevant and reliable financial information 
to safeguard shareholders' investment and the company's assets and publish useful 
information so that those interested in its content can make the right decisions. 
 
Thus, within this study we consider it appropriate to carry out an analysis, focusing 
mainly on the following hypothesis: Might the quality of the company's financial 
information be conditioned by a Board which is made up of a greater number of 
independent directors? We focus the study on this hypothesis, as we believe that it is 
one of the areas of research that has gained most importance in recent years because 
of its importance and the possible consequences, especially the economic ones, of 
poor quality financial information, and because previous evidence is not conclusive, as 
we have highlighted above, and which will be developed in more detail in the following 
sections. 
 
Therefore, the aim of this study is to conduct a thorough review of previous literature to 
understand how the presence of independent directors on corporate governance 
bodies, and particularly on the Board, affects the quality of financial reporting. 
 
The study is structured as follows. Following the introduction, a review of the 
bibliography of the existing literature from 1970 to 1990 on the impact of the 
independent directors on the quality of financial reporting. Then, in the third paragraph, 
we continue with the review of literature from 1990 to the present. Moreover, in each of 
the time periods, the evidence is organised as follows; we start with the main idea used 
as a basis by the authors, followed by the hypothesis presented and the conclusions 
which are reached. And finally, in the fourth paragraph, the findings and the inherent 
limitations of this study are shown. 
 
2. BIBLIOGRAPHY REVIEW FROM 1970-1990: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS ON THE BOARD AND THE QUALITY OF FINANCIAL 
REPORTS 
 
To analyse the relationship between corporate governance practices in companies, 
and in particular the presence of independent directors, and the impact that these 
directors have on the quality of accounting information, it is important to name the 
agency theory (Fama and Jensen, 1976 and Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Above all if we 
pay special attention to large companies, where management and ownership are 
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separated, and therefore, owners are unable to control all the movements made by 
managers or agents. There is a certain tendency for managers to manipulate the 
outcome to their own benefit. However, the problems associated with the separation of 
ownership and control were not so relevant or didn't catch the attention of researchers 
until the 1930's, when publications by Berle and Means (1932) and Coase (1937) came 
to light. However, some authors claim that the interests of managers and shareholders 
differ widely given that managers are people who go in search of prestige, money and 
power over the company, and thus try to impose their personal goals on the company, 
unlike shareholders who just seek financial benefits (Garcia, 2003). With all this we 
present the agency theory as the theoretical framework on which further evidence is 
later based. 
 
The agency theory includes proposals for reform within the Board to include a certain 
percentage of independent directors. Undoubtedly this is a reasonable action that will 
lead to the independence of the Board, not only with respect to external events, but 
also on internal proposals from the management team, and in particular from the chief 
executive. Furthermore, transparency must be the main principle behind the Board's 
activities in order to build trust and improve the quality of financial information for 
external users. In this way, it helps companies portray a trustworthy image. Ultimately, 
the agency theory sees the Board as the primary mechanism for management control, 
which implies that the majority of its directors must be independent of management and 
the main objective of these directors must be their control over managers. 
 
Following that we will present the results of that line of research which has studied the 
relationship between corporate governance and the quality of financial reporting 
between 1970 and 1990. Therefore, the analysis will focus primarily on the Board and 
in particular, on the supervisory role played by independent directors against the quality 
of financial reporting. 
 
According to Fame (1980) and Jensen et al. (1983), the Board is a tool for monitoring 
managers, highlighting the presence of independent directors as a mechanism that 
enhances the effectiveness of the supervisory role of the Board, as they provide 
balance and help limit possible opportunistic management behaviour. The idea behind 
this study is that the structure of the Board should be made up mainly of independent 
directors and not employees or people close to them. This way, the elaboration of 
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accounting information in favour of the interests of those on the inside, in order to 
obtain benefits, can be avoided. In short, the authors document a significant 
relationship between the characteristics of the Council, composed mainly of 
independent directors, and the integrity of accounting information. 
 
Mace (1986) frames his research among those who see in the independent directors 
the capacity to improve the presentation of published accounting information. Thus, the 
independent directors become relevant within the supervisory role of the Board, not 
only by assuming independence from those that govern, but also by decisions made 
based on their experience and knowledge. In this sense, the author tries to show the 
positive effects of a large number of independent directors present on the Board and 
the quality of financial reporting. Mace (1986) concludes that the existence of  
independent directors on the Board gives more relevance and credibility to financial 
information, on the understanding that as the presence of the same on the Board is 
increased, higher quality financial reporting and transparency will be reflected. 
 
Along the same lines, Weisbach (1988) hypothesised that Boards with a greater 
presence of independent directors have a positive impact on the quality of financial 
reporting, increasing it. The conclusion reached by the author strengthens this 
hypothesis, since the independent directors put greater pressure on managers, i.e. 
these counselors are considered a disciplinary measure on management. 
 
However, unlike the findings obtained through empirical evidence mentioned above, we 
can see how the results are not always conclusive. Not all empirical evidence shows 
that Boards with a higher proportion of independent directors positively influence the 
quality of financial reports. Here, MacAvoy et al. (1983) hypothesised that the quality of 
accounting information isn't positively related to the proportion of external directors, 
particularly independent ones. The results show that neither the percentage of directors 
who do not hold an executive position in the company, nor the percentage of 
independent directors are significantly related to greater integrity of financial 
information. Therefore, we may conclude that the increased presence of independent 
directors on the Board does not increase the efficiency and quality of accounting 
information. 
 
Shleifer et al. (1986) begin their research predicting that the directors forming the 
Board assume the role of traditional owners of the company and exercise more direct 
control over management, thus reducing the agency problem. However, they stress 
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that among some of the features of external advisers, like their ownership of the 
company or time spent on the Council, help to reduce fraudulent accounting practices 
and thereby improve the quality of accounting information. Thus Shleifer et al. (1986) 
hypothesised that the increased presence of independent directors on the Board 
decreases the level of manipulation, and thereby increases the quality of financial 
information. In contrast to what has been observed in an Anglo-Saxon context, and 
which served as a basis for the recommendations of the Olivencia Report (1998), the 
results did not confirm the hypothesis raised by Shleifer et al. (1986), as it revealed that 
the presence of independent directors was positively and significantly related to the 
level of manipulation. Therefore, the authors concluded that independent directors 
decreased the quality of financial information. 
 
Eisenberg et al. (1987) attempt to corroborate that a Board composed mainly of 
independent directors does not affect the quality of financial information, establishing 
this as the hypothesis under comparison. The authors reveal the existence of a 
negative and insignificant relationship between the higher percentage of non-executive 
directors, independent ones to be precise, and the presentation of financial information. 
In short, they document that what really has a positive effect, increasing the quality of 
accounting information is the higher percentage of executive directors. According to the 
authors, external directors are required mainly for independence from management, 
while internal executives or directors are those who are genuinely well informed about 
the company. In short, these authors characterise independent directors as those 
members of the Board with the ability or the power to help oversee and facilitate 
financial information. 
 
Collins and Kothari (1989) attempt to show evidence of a negative relationship between 
corporate governance, including among other attributes the independence of the 
independent directors, and the quality of financial reporting. The authors defend the 
idea that the Boards composed mostly of independent directors give little credibility to  
financial information as these  tend to perform supervisory work more efficiently than   
management (executive directors) in reference to an improvement in quality of 
accounting information. Therefore, the results showed that only those businesses with 
a higher class in terms of corporate governance experience significantly improve the 
quality of financial information, whether those directors who make up the Board are 
executive or non-executive. Moreover, the authors emphasise that under weak 
corporate governance, adding a large number of independent directors would only 
have negative effects, lessening the credibility and quality of the published financial 
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information. In short, the evidence documents a negative relationship between 
independent directors on the Board and a higher quality of financial reporting. The 
authors argue that the inclusion of independent directors on the Board is not sufficient 
to increase the quality of accounting information, as it shows that the mere existence of 
these directors does not seem to deter   opportunistic management behaviour, or the 
existence of fraudulent practices within companies. Ultimately, the authors conclude 
that the presence of these counselors does not entail greater credibility for those who 
might use the financial information. 
 
 
3. BIBLIOGRAPHY REVIEW FROM 1990 TO PRESENT DAY: THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS ON THE BOARD AND THE QUALITY OF 
FINANCIAL REPORTS 
 
Following the same line of research while transferring it to the decade of the 90's to 
present, we start with authors like Romano et al. (1996) and Dalton et al. (1998). Both 
extensively review previous literature and support the hypothesis that external directors 
are always at a disadvantage in relation to the information available to management 
teams. Therefore, disciplinary action will only take place when the results are 
notoriously negative, i.e. the influence of external directors on conduct and results will 
only be visible when companies get into difficulties. The authors show that there is no 
empirical evidence which might establish a direct relationship between the composition 
of the Board, in particular, a higher proportion of independent directors, and the 
disclosure of quality financial information. Therefore, the authors conclude that the 
presence of independent directors on the Board protects the management team more 
than it disciplines it. We stress what has been discussed above and in particular "the 
independent directors on the Board protect more ...”, because it may lead to incorrect 
interpretations. Thus, independent directors do not externally supervise accounting 
information, which refers us to their lack of independence from management, but they 
simply try to safeguard the owners' interests. This deters independent directors from 
their main responsibilities such as striving to prevent managers from producing 
fraudulent financial information, which would weaken the credibility and quality of the 
same, and also preventing opportunistic management behaviour, among others. 
 
Beasley et al. (1996) highlight that the concern for implementing good corporate 
governance practices leads to the introduction of a higher proportion of independent 
directors on the Board. Thus, the authors suggest that the effectiveness of this 
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mechanism, a majority of independent directors on the Board, can be measured 
through the reflected impact on the presentation of accounting information. Therefore, 
the authors hypothesise that the quality of financial information is positively related to 
the proportion of independent directors on the Board. The results confirm the 
hypothesis, since evidence shows that an increased presence of independent directors 
on the Board results in higher quality financial information. Therefore, according to 
these results it can be shown how good corporate governance practices contribute to 
the spread of a greater volume of accounting information, focused primarily on more 
relevant data for users and also presented in a way that it becomes more accessible, 
credible and transparent for them. Similarly, Weisbach et al. (2003) stress the dominant 
role that independent directors should play towards increasing the quality of accounting 
information, becoming guarantors of this. However, the authors highlight the possible 
lack of real independence of so-called independent directors, noting that if managers 
are involved in the hiring process, the independence of these directors remains in 
question. The hypothesis raised by the authors highlights how the existence and 
composition of the nomination committee affects the restrictive role that independent 
directors play in the manipulation of results, and therefore less transparency and 
quality of accounting information. Indeed, the results confirm the prediction that the 
composition of the nomination committee affects the role of independent directors, 
indicating that the real independence of these depends on who appoints them. The 
results show a negative relation between the level of manipulation and the proportion of 
independent members on the Board, when the company has a nomination committee 
composed of a majority of proprietary members. In contrast, the results document a 
positive association between the presence of independent directors on the Board and 
the quality of financial information, when the nomination committee consists of 
independent directors. In summary, the results obtained show that the presence of 
proprietary directors on the nominating committee is negatively and significantly related 
to the level of manipulation and also to lower quality financial information, while 
independent directors who form part of the nominating committee positively influence 
the quality of accounting information, when it is they who appoint independent 
members to the Board. 
 
In line with earlier predictions, in order to strengthen the monitoring role to be played by 
independent directors, the Aldama report (2003) recommended the existence of 
delegated committees, responsible for appointing independent directors, among their 
functions. Similarly, the Olivencia report (1998) stated its concern at what was 
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considered a wrong interpretation of the figure of the independent director, giving more 
emphasis to who they are rather than what they know. 
 
Accordingly, the evidence within a continental environment like that of Fernandez 
Alvarez et al. (1998), reason how special supervisory work of the external directors is 
enhanced by their independence from management and by the incentives for carrying 
out their role, which includes protecting their reputation and possible legal implications 
arising from inefficient supervision. Therefore, the hypothesis posed is whether the 
independence of the Board favours the quality of accounting information. The authors 
document a positive and significant relationship between the tasks performed by 
independent directors and the quality of accounting information, while the role of the 
Audit Committee on the quality of financial information is irrelevant. 
 
Continuing with the literature review, we consider it relevant to name Vafeas (1999), 
who pointed out from the outset that there is a positive association between the 
activities performed by independent directors and the quality of accounting information. 
Furthermore, he adds that the independent directors on the Board should take a more 
active position with respect to the other directors in order to safeguard the quality of 
accounting information. In this sense, Vafeas (1999) sets a contrasting hypothesis 
whether the influence of the independent directors might enhance the quality of 
published financial information. After the results were obtained it was shown that the 
fact of integrating more independent directors onto the Board has a positive impact on 
the quality of financial reporting. The author justifies this result on the grounds that 
independent directors are not linked to the ownership of the company and therefore do 
not tend to manipulate information to their own benefits. 
 
In relation to the previous evidence revealed by Vafeas (1999), it seems relevant to 
incorporate the empirical theory contrasted by Kasnik (1999), which basically stresses 
manipulative practices. Specifically, he says that those factors of good corporate 
governance which lead to higher quality accounting information will be considered as 
those that limit the freedom of action of management, reducing the use of manipulative 
practices. Kasnik (1999) considers the independent directors on the Board as a 
measure of good corporate governance that can help to increase the quality of financial 
reporting. 
 
Within the same line of research, Peasnell et al. (2001) attempt to show that 
independent directors and audit committees reduce the manipulation of benefits, 
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particularly when there are incentives to do so. The authors argue that good corporate 
governance practices can reduce fraudulent activity and improve the quality of financial 
reporting. The results confirmed their predictions, since it was revealed that 
independent directors bring greater integrity to the financial information (less 
manipulated). Having an audit committee does not appear to directly affect such 
manipulation, but the independent directors are more efficient when the company has 
an audit committee. 
 
Similarly, Klein (2002) and Xie et al. (2003) propose that the independence of the Audit 
Committee and the Board tends to reduce the manipulation of profits, thereby 
achieving to publish more quality financial information. After empirically contrasting the 
hypothesis, evidence reveals that both counselors and independent audit committees 
reduce manipulation, particularly when most of the members are independent (but not 
necessarily all of them). Therefore, the authors conclude that the presence of 
institutional investors (proprietary directors) in a lesser proportion than the independent 
directors also helps to reduce manipulation and improves the presentation of 
accounting information. 
 
Similarly, Anderson et al. (2004) hypothesized in their work that the independence of 
the Board increases the quality of financial reporting. The paper concludes that the 
degree of independence does not show any relationship with the quality of accounting 
information, in contrast to the prominent role that literature, both theoretical and 
empirical (mainly Anglo-Saxon), attributes to the independence of the Board. That is, 
the evidence revealed by these authors confirms that a Board composed of 
independent directors is considered an instrument to safeguard the quality of 
accounting information. It is possible that this evidence derives from the presence of 
executives or proprietary directors on the Board, the lack of rotation of independent 
directors or both causes simultaneously, among other issues. 
 
Anderson et al. (2004) and Carcello and Neal (2000) show the negative effects of the 
presence of independent directors on the Board on improving accounting quality. 
Carcello and Neal (2000), in contrast to Anderson et al. (2004) attribute the failure of 
the supervisory role of independent directors to the fact that these are not independent 
to the management of the business. Thus, these authors conclude that the presence of 
independent directors on the Board will only increase the quality of financial information 
when they have no links with the management of the organisation. 
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Bedard et al. (2004) propose that those companies that include solely independent 
directors on their Board will not be effective in carrying out their tasks of supervision 
and control. Therefore, Bedard et al. (2004) developed their research insisting that 
among some of the measures of good corporate governance, and in particular 100% 
independent directors, are not always a good determinant in monitoring managerial 
activity. Moreover, the authors also defend that a Board which consists entirely of 
independent directors is not an adequate measure for increasing the quality of 
published information or the credibility of such. The hypothesis that the authors present 
is the idea that the presence of independent directors on the Board reduces the quality 
of financial reporting. The results support the hypothesis, it is documented that the 
trend towards an increase in the number of independent directors on the Board, results 
in low levels of quality and transparency in financial reporting, due to the concentration 
of so many external directors. 
 
Farber (2005) tries to ratify how weak corporate governance structures, based on a 
larger number of executive directors, are a necessary ally of fraud or manipulation of 
accounting information. Hence, several of the firms involved in accounting scandals in 
the United States exhibit little independence and activity on boards and committees 
and a weaker presence of experts on these supervisory and control bodies. The author 
also notes that in many large US companies the President of the Board is also the chief 
executive. From these findings, the author tries to corroborate that a large number of 
executive directors is associated with an increase in the manipulation of company 
accounts and thus less transparency and quality of financial information. The results 
confirm their hypothesis, documenting that the manipulation of accounting information 
is greater when members of the Board are linked to the management of the company 
itself. 
 
It is also interesting to add to this study the accurate reflection of Pope (2001) and 
Young et al. (2005), who suggest that the effectiveness of the Board in the monitoring 
and supervision of the accounting function depends largely on the ability of the external 
directors to understand issues of accounting techniques. So it is hoped, since a 
significant proportion of external directors, especially independent ones, have held 
management positions in large companies or have developed long academic careers 
as auditors or advisors. In the Spanish case, according to the annual report by Spencer 
Stuart (2007) for 2006, 19% of independent directors in Spanish listed companies are 
entrepreneurs, 19% come from being chief executive at another company, 24% are 
retired executives, 20% are freelancers, 7% are academics and 2% ex-politicians. 
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Now, relating this assessment to corporate governance and its effect on the reliability 
and transparency of financial information, it is emphasised that the results presented 
for the Spanish context and those obtained in previous studies in an Anglo-Saxon 
context, primarily in terms of the role of the independent directors, do not lead to similar 
results, but differ substantially, establishing the United States and the United Kingdom 
as the main references in the Anglo-Saxon context. According to Recalde (2003), this 
is because business culture, the ownership structure of our companies and institutional 
characteristics are different. 
 
Unlike the previous research work, we continue with the literature review presenting the 
evidence provided by Osterland (2004) and Ajinkya et al. (2005 ), which documented 
that the additional presence of independent directors on the Board allows for 
monitoring the quality of financial information and thereby enhances the credibility of 
the company  in the eyes of those requiring accounting information. The role that such 
directors should adopt within the Board is to advocate transparency of information 
between shareholders and managers, which is one of their main responsibilities. 
Similarly, they focused the empirical test stating that a higher ratio of independent 
directors is associated with higher quality and quantity of accounting disclosure to 
interested groups. Ultimately, Osterland (2004) and Ajinkya et al. (2005) have validated 
the link between the two aspects, contrasting that the effectiveness of the Board 
represented by a larger number of independent directors is positively associated with 
the disclosure of quality financial information. 
 
However, it seems appropriate to introduce as a second point of view some of the 
evidence which pointed to beliefs which were totally opposed to those previously 
named such as Haniffa et al. (2002), Rammer et al. (2006), Teitel et al. (2008) and 
Davila et al. (2009). That is, these studies did not reveal positive evidence regarding 
the implementation of the principles of good governance and the inclusion of 
independent directors on their Boards with respect to reporting and accounting 
manipulation. Therefore, the hypothesis on which they focus tries to show evidence of 
how directors on the Board, and especially independent ones, do not increase the 
quality of information. The results do not confirm the hypothesis since they reveal that 
the independence of the Board contributes to the council acting on the 
recommendations of good corporate governance, and in turn publishing less harmful 
accounting information. Therefore, the high degree of independence of the Board 
highlights two key issues: first, it leads to greater control over the company's activities; 
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secondly, it contributes to greater transparency due to the desire to maintain a good 
reputation.  
 
Following this evidence, the research carried out by Duchin et al. (2010) states that 
when the Executive Director of the company, hereafter referred to as CEO, belongs to 
the nomination committee, or when no such committee exists, the listed companies will 
tend to hire fewer independent directors and more proprietary directors on the Board. 
Thus, the hypothesis raised by these authors is that the larger number of proprietary 
directors on the Board has a positive effect on the quality of financial information, while 
the presence of independent directors has no effect on it. Once the corresponding 
empirical analysis was concluded, Duchin et al. (2010) confirmed the hypothesis. The 
authors justify these results indicating that increasing the number of independent 
directors on the Board has no effect on the quality of financial information, since the 
Executive Director of the Company (CEO) dominates the selection process of the 
candidates and uses it to place his allies on the Board. In this case, the directors take 
on a decorative role, away from any monitoring task, helping the CEO to take hold in 
office. 
 
Next we can see more recent empirical findings such as the work of Ho et al. (2011) 
and Barros et al. (2013). On the one hand, the theory developed by Ho et al. (2011) 
predicts that the proportion of independent members on the Board is inversely related 
to the level of manipulation and therefore to the quality of accounting information. To 
prove this hypothesis, the authors try to reason the various types of knowledge that an 
independent director may have of the organisation to which he is director in order to 
determine whether they contribute or not to increasing the quality of accounting 
information. It is true that the independent director is not usually aware, to the same 
degree, of the problems that can frequently arise within the company in comparison to 
executive directors, in other words they are not aware of those small particular details 
of the organisation as directors would be. But we can say that their role is different from 
the other directors on the Board. According to Ho et al. (2011), the independent 
directors may provide an improvement in the quality of accounting information with their 
knowledge about the sector, with their strategic vision, overseeing the work of the 
executives or ensuring social interest, among other issues. In addition, before making 
any major decision, the independent director is required to inform in detail of all its 
possible consequences and implications for each part of the business. For this reason 
you can not and should not generalise that independent directors lack the knowledge 
necessary to make important decisions within the organization. Ho et al. (2011) 
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conclude that both executive and non-executive directors and independent directors in 
particular, contribute to the management and improvement of the disclosure of 
accounting information. 
Moreover, regarding the empirical evidence by Barros et al. (2013) it is assumed that 
the inclusion of independent directors on boards will improve the performance of the 
company given the recommendations of good corporate governance, and in turn, that 
this measure will provide better quality accounting information. Indeed, after the 
corresponding analysis of this assessment, a positive relationship between the 
percentage of independent directors on the Board and the quality of accounting 
information can be seen. Thus, the authors conclude that the presence of independent 
directors in comparison to other directors is an important control mechanism, since 
they provide security with regards to the interests of retail shareholders. In conclusion, 
an increased presence of external directors, particularly independent directors, 
counteracts the temptation of internal directors or executives to make decisions 
focused on their own personal benefit, putting a stop to  the manipulation of accounts 
and therefore, leading to an increase in the quality of financial reporting. 
 
In the Spanish context, García Osma and Gill de Albornoz (2007) hypothesise that the 
composition of the Board and the existence of the Audit Committee affect the quality of 
financial information published by Spanish listed companies. Findings from this study 
document a positive relation between the improvement and quality of accounting 
information and the structure of the Board without significant presence of the Audit 
Committee. Therefore, this study considers that the increased presence of non-
executive directors, particularly independent directors, may be a good step towards 
publishing financial information with a high degree of transparency and credibility. 
  
Gisbert et al. (2011) show that the greater the amount of accounting information 
presented voluntarily by the company, the more credible and trustworthy such 
information is seen, among other things because of the professional prestige of the 
independent directors present on the Board. So, an effective Board structure is closely 
linked to the improvement in the quality of financial reporting. Similarly, effective 
management supervision can only be carried out by someone completely unrelated to 
the management team. With this, the authors hypothesise that a positive relation 
between the percentage of independent directors present on the Board and the 
voluntary information offered by companies. Despite the findings, the results led to a 
contradiction of the thesis under question. Therefore, the results revealed that a higher 
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percentage of independent directors on the Board did not have a positive effect with 
greater voluntary disclosure of information, and therefore did not contribute to 
increasing the credibility and quality of the same. 
 
On the average Spanish Board, 30% of the Board members are independent directors 
(Sánchez and García, 2000). Thereafter several studies in other countries show 
evidence, in comparison, of the shortage of independent directors on Spanish councils. 
Examples of these studies are those by Anderson et al (2003) in the United States, 
whose data show that 52% of US Board members are independent directors on 
average. Also in a sample of US firms, Ashbaugh et al (2006) conclude that an average 
of 70% of directors are independent. 
 
It should be noted that Spanish companies do not comply to the recommendations of 
CUBG (2006) which refers to the existence of at least one third of independent 
directors within the Board. Thus, "Spanish legislation gives each company complete 
freedom to decide whether to follow, or not, the recommendations of corporate 
governance, but it requires that, when they do, they disclose the reasons that justify 
their actions, so that shareholders, investors and markets may pass judgement." This 
allows us to detail the main difference between the European and American context 
regarding corporate governance measures contained in these codes. In other words, 
Europe has largely opted for the voluntary adoption of the recommendations contained 
in such codes while in the United States many of them are compulsory for listed 
companies. As evidence of these differences, one may consult the study by Heidrick 
and Struggles (2003) on the governance practices of the leading European companies, 
in which Spain appears towards the bottom of the list. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS. 
The series of financial scandals in recent years and the global economic and financial 
crisis have lead to a lack of confidence in capital markets. To remedy this situation, 
regulatory organisations established codes of good corporate governance with an aim 
to improving the transparency of information and the management of corporate 
governance. Moreover, companies are affected by agency problems arising from the 
separation of ownership and control, creating a demand for internal and external 
mechanisms to increase supervision and control. 
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The aim of our study is to review the previous literature on whether an increased 
presence of independent directors on corporate governance bodies, and particularly on 
the Board, affects the quality of the financial information published by companies. To 
achieve our objective we focused the study on two time periods, from 1970 to 1990 and 
from 1990 to the present. So the question mentioned above "if a greater presence of 
independent directors ..." is established as the hypothesis in the different findings 
developed throughout the study. Therefore, we consider this to be one of the most 
important lines of research in recent years. The evidence reveals that the presence of 
independent directors on the Board can be positive, negative or have no impact at all. 
 
The results have revealed that most findings show a positive and significant 
relationship between the proportion of independent directors on the Board, with respect 
to the rest of counselors, and an improvement in the quality of financial reporting. 
Among them we can mention authors such as Fama (1980), Jensen et al. (1983) and 
Mace (1986), within the time frame between 1970 and 1990. These authors agreed on 
two points: firstly that independent directors prevented opportunistic behaviour of both 
managers and internal members of the company; secondly, they agreed that 
independent directors not only improved the quality of accounting information, but also 
offered greater transparency and credibility to the public. However, authors such as 
Shleifer et al. (1986) and Eisenberg et al. (1987), in the same time period, concluded 
completely contrary results. These studies document that the improvement in the 
quality of accounting information is not associated with the presence of independent 
directors on the Board. The authors defend the idea that the Board should be mainly 
composed of executive directors, since they have the most knowledge of the company. 
In short, the non-executive directors, especially independent directors, merely 
supervise and facilitate information. 
 
With respect to the results revealed in the time period from 1990 to the present, we can 
indicate a variety of conclusions based on the different results of the authors. Here we 
refer to very mixed results. Evidence like Vafeas (1999) and Carcello and Neal (2000), 
among others, which show a positive relationship between the independent directors 
on the Board and an improvement in the quality of financial information, as they are 
regarded as members of Board who are totally unrelated to the ownership of the 
company. However, it should be added that this is so in the case of real independence, 
which depends on who appointed them, as pointed out by Weisbach et al. (2003). 
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Finally, the results of Anderson et al. (2004) and Gisbert et al. (2011) should be noted, 
but with different positions to those previously discussed. Anderson et al. (2004) does 
not show any relationship between the degree of independence of the Board and the 
quality of accounting information, while Gisbert et al. (2011), despite initial predictions 
that  pointed towards a positive effect between the two factors, their results showed 
that the presence of independent directors did not contribute to increasing credibility 
nor the disclosure of accounting information.  
 
Finally, we should point out that this study has its limitations. We would like to 
emphasize that after a comprehensive review of previous literature with an aim  to 
addressing many of the existing studies, we assume that the majority of them have 
remained unchecked. 
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